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Dancing in the Dark:
Of Provinces and Section 35 Rights
After 2010
Kerry Wilkins*
I. THE ANTINOMY1
The bad news is that we still do not know all that we really need to
know about provincial capacity and the rights recognized and affirmed in
section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.2
1. The One Hand
On the one hand, the Supreme Court has told us that “[t]he text and
purpose of s. 35(1) do not distinguish between federal and provincial
laws which restrict aboriginal or treaty rights, and they should both be
subject to the same standard of constitutional scrutiny”3 and, on several
occasions now, that justified provincial interference with Aboriginal
rights, at least, is constitutionally permissible.4 In none of these decisions
*
Of the Ontario Bar. These are, of course, personal views, not necessarily those of any of
my clients or employers, past, present or future. Special thanks to Ben Berger and to the indefatigable Kent McNeil, whose careful review of an earlier draft resulted, as usual, in very helpful
suggestions for improvement, and to Kristina Gill and Hue Nguyen, whose research assistance on a
different project proved very fruitful for this one.
1
Thanks to Dwight Newman for reminding me of this perfectly apposite word.
2
Being Schedule B of the Canada Act, 1982 (U.K.) 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Constitution
Act, 1982”].
3
R. v. Côté, [1996] S.C.J. No. 93, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 139, at para. 74 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
“Côté”]. Compare Paul v. British Columbia (Forest Appeals Commission), [2003] S.C.J. No. 34,
2003 SCC 55, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 585, at para. 24 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Paul”] (“Section 35 … applies
to both [the] provinces and the federal government”).
4
See Côté, id., at para. 74; Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] S.C.J. No. 108,
[1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, at para. 160 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Delgamuukw”]; Paul, id., at paras. 24-25. It
is interesting to observe in each case how the Court arrived at this conclusion. In Côté, id., the Court
relied on R. v. Badger, [1996] S.C.J. No. 39, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 771 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Badger”] for
support. Badger is indeed a case about a provincial law, and does say (at para. 85, as the Court in
Côté correctly notes) that infringement of the relevant rights must be justified. But Badger, first, is a
case about a treaty right, not an Aboriginal right, and second, is a case that turns crucially on the
special constitutional powers conferred on the province of Alberta by para. 12 of the Alberta Natural
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was it necessary for the Court to pronounce upon this issue,5 but sooner
or later, other things equal, by dint of repetition alone, this dictum could
become the law. In the single case to date in which the Court did find a
provincial law to infringe an Aboriginal right,6 the Court proceeded in a
manner consistent with this understanding of things.7 Conclusions in
other decisions also support, or at least bespeak, this general view. In
Delgamuukw,8 the Court, when listing legislative objectives sufficient to
anchor justified infringements of Aboriginal title, included among them
several that lie well within provincial legislative authority.9 And in
Haida,10 the Court left no doubt that the provincial, as well as the federal
Crown, must consult with relevant Aboriginal communities before
engaging in conduct that might adversely affect credibly claimed Aboriginal rights.11 This conclusion, at a minimum, makes a good deal more
sense if one accepts that provinces have at least some constitutional
capacity to affect such rights adversely. Finally, a rule that allowed for
justified provincial infringement of treaty and Aboriginal rights would
have certain evident practical advantages. One is simplicity: everyone
would know at a glance exactly what the game was and be able to
proceed accordingly. Another is that such a dispensation would make it
safer for courts to be generous about accrediting claims of treaty or
Resources Transfer Agreement, 1930 (“NRTA”), Schedule 2 to the Constitution Act, 1930 (U.K.),
20-21 Geo. V, c. 26, and s. 1 of the Constitution Act, 1930: see Badger, at para. 47. But for that
special authority, the analysis and outcome in Badger might well have been different: see Badger, at
para. 69. Delgamuukw, id., in turn, relied entirely on Côté as support for this proposition. And the
Court in Paul relied (at para. 25) on R. v. Sparrow, [1990] S.C.J. No. 49, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Sparrow”], “for the proposition that government regulation, including
provincial regulation, may, by legislation, infringe an aboriginal right if that infringement is
justified”. But Sparrow is a case concerned exclusively with federal, not provincial, regulation of an
Aboriginal right and did not consider, nor need to consider, the relationship between provincial
legislation and Aboriginal rights.
5
In Côté, id., the Court concluded (at para. 77) that the only relevant provincial regulation
did not infringe the relevant Aboriginal right; in Delgamuukw, id., the Court concluded (at paras. 73108) that it was necessary to send the case back to trial to ascertain whether the Aboriginal right at
issue — Aboriginal title, in that instance — existed; and in Paul, id., the issue before the Court was
not whether any provincial legislation infringed the appellant’s Aboriginal rights.
6
R. v. Sappier; R. v. Gray, [2006] S.C.J. No. 54, 2006 SCC 54, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 686
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Sappier”].
7
See id., at para. 55 (the Crown offered no justification for the infringement). Again,
therefore, it was not necessary for the Court to consider whether justified provincial infringement is
constitutionally permissible.
8
Supra, note 4.
9
Id., at para. 165.
10
Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests), [2004] S.C.J. No. 70, 2004 SCC
73, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 511 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Haida”].
11
See id., at paras. 57-59.
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Aboriginal rights. The stakes in such adjudications increase considerably
if section 35 rights, once acknowledged to be in effect, enjoy what
amounts to all but absolute immunity from meaningful provincial
interference.12
2. The Other Hand
On the other hand, no one has yet succeeded in identifying a plausible source of any provincial constitutional capacity to infringe, even in
justified ways, existing treaty or Aboriginal rights.13 With the arguable
exception of those in Haida,14 the Supreme Court’s pronouncements on
section 35 and provincial authority in the cases cited above rely on weak
judicial authority15 and offer little in the way of supportive legal reasoning. This in itself would not be a problem were there not real reason
elsewhere in Canadian constitutional law to question the provinces’
general capacity to infringe, with or without justification, the kinds of
rights that section 35 now recognizes and affirms.16 But as it happens,
there is.

12
On this last issue see, e.g., W.I.C. Binnie, “The Sparrow Doctrine: Beginning of the End
or End of the Beginning?” (1990) 15 Queen’s L.J. 217; Kerry Wilkins, “Judicial Aesthetics and
Aboriginal Claims”, in Kerry Wilkins, ed., Advancing Aboriginal Claims: Visions; Strategies;
Directions (Saskatoon: Purich Publishing, 2004), at 300-302; Kerry Wilkins, “R. v. Morris: A Shot
in the Dark and Its Repercussions” (2008) 7 Indigenous L.J. 1, at 33-35 [hereinafter “Wilkins,
‘Morris’”].
13
By contrast, an obvious source of independent federal authority to infringe s. 35 rights
and to constrain their exercise is s. 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3,
reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5 [hereinafter “Constitution Act, 1867”], which confers on the
federal order of government exclusive authority to make laws about matters relating to “Indians, and
Lands reserved for the Indians”. This and other “[f]ederal legislative powers continue” despite s. 35
of the Constitution Act, 1982, subject only to the requirement that Canada justify federal legislation
and government action that infringes s. 35 rights: Sparrow, supra, note 4, at 1109.
14
Supra, note 10.
15
For elaboration, see supra, note 4.
16
One must speak here of provinces’ general capacity, or lack thereof, to infringe because
there are specific exceptions to the proposition in the text. According to para. 12 of the Alberta and
Saskatchewan NRTAs and para. 13 of the Manitoba NRTA, provincial “laws respecting game in
force ... from time to time” in those provinces “shall apply to the Indians within the boundaries
thereof”, subject to certain important limits also set out there. By virtue of s. 1 of the Constitution
Act, 1930, to which these three NRTAs are schedules, these arrangements “shall have the force of
law notwithstanding anything in the Constitution Act, 1867, or any Act amending the same, or any
Act of the Parliament of Canada, or in any Order in Council or terms or conditions of union made or
approved under any such Act as aforesaid”. In other words, provincial game laws in the prairie
provinces apply, subject to the specified limits, regardless of any restrictions elsewhere in the
Constitution on provincial legislative authority.
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The concern emanates from constitutional principles that the courts
have held to constrain provincial authority before and apart from section
35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. In Delgamuukw17 the Supreme Court
held, and in Paul18 it acknowledged, that “the whole range of aboriginal
rights that are protected by s. 35(1)” of the Constitution Act, 1982 come
within a core of legislative authority that section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867 reserves exclusively to the federal order of government.19
The fact that both decisions also say that justified provincial infringement of Aboriginal rights is constitutionally permissible20 does not
contribute to the cause of doctrinal clarity. Supreme Court and other
jurisprudence have said the same of the rights conferred or preserved in
Crown treaties with Aboriginal peoples.21 This clearly means that
provincial laws whose purposes or effects22 suggest advertent attempts to
extinguish, impair or even relate to any such rights or their exercise are
constitutionally invalid: without force or effect. According to traditional
constitutional doctrine, it also means that impairment or extinguishment
of such rights may not result even inadvertently from the application of
valid provincial legislation.23 When courts conclude that the relevant
provincial measure operates inadvertently, through the generality of its
language, to impair some core federal matter, they read it down, construing it more narrowly to preclude that inadvertent effect, to preserve its
constitutional validity.24 This analysis suggests that the provinces do not
17
18
19

Supra, note 4.
Supra, note 3.
See Delgamuukw, supra, note 4, at para. 178 (compare at para. 181); Paul, supra, note 3,

at para. 33.
20

See supra, note 4, and accompanying text.
See R. v. Morris, [2006] S.C.J. No. 59, 2006 SCC 59, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 915, at para. 43
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Morris”], Deschamps and Abella JJ. (for the majority), at para. 91, McLachlin
C.J.C. and Fish J. (dissenting); R. v. Simon, [1985] S.C.J. No. 67, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 387, at 411
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Simon”]; R. v. Moosehunter, [1981] S.C.J. No. 27, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 282, at 293
(S.C.C.) (“The Government of Canada can alter the rights of Indians under treaties ... Provinces
cannot.”); R. v. White and Bob, [1964] B.C.J. No. 212, 50 D.L.R. (2d) 613, at 618 (B.C.C.A.), Davey
J.A. (for the plurality), affd on related grounds, [1965] S.C.J. No. 80, [1965] S.C.R. vi, 52 D.L.R.
(2d) 491 (S.C.C.).
22
See, e.g., Kitkatla Band v. British Columbia (Minister of Small Business, Tourism and
Culture), [2002] S.C.J. No. 33, 2002 SCC 31, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 146, at paras. 52-54 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “Kitkatla”].
23
See, e.g., Delgamuukw, supra, note 4, at para. 181 (“s. 91(24) protects a core of federal
jurisdiction even from provincial laws of general application, through the operation of the doctrine
of interjurisdictional immunity”) and para. 177 (“s. 91(24) protects a ‘core’ of Indianness from
provincial intrusion, through the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity”); Paul, supra, note 3, at
para. 15.
24
See, e.g., Derrickson v. Derrickson, [1986] S.C.J. No. 16, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 285, at 296
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Derrickson”] (“When otherwise valid provincial legislation, given the
21
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now have, and never have had, any power to impair, let alone to extinguish, the existing treaty or Aboriginal rights of section 91(24) Indians.
In 2006, the Supreme Court reached essentially this conclusion in respect
of Indian treaty rights.25
In summary, several Supreme Court of Canada decisions have espoused or supported the view that provinces may infringe Aboriginal
rights if they can justify the infringement;26 several Supreme Court of
Canada decisions — including some of those same decisions27 — have
held that Aboriginal and treaty rights lie within a core of exclusive
federal legislative authority and that provincial law may not impair or
intrude upon such matters, even inadvertently.
I confess that I have not been able to find a satisfactory way of reconciling these parallel but contending streams of Supreme Court jurisprudence. I know of three diverse lines of attempt to reconcile them, but
I find none of them convincing.
3. Unsuccessful Attempts at Resolution
Some suggest, first, that all courts need do to resolve this conundrum
is recognize a distinction between infringement of an existing treaty or
generality of its terms, extends beyond the matter over which the legislature has jurisdiction and over
a matter of federal exclusive jurisdiction, it must, in order to preserve its constitutionality, be read
down and given the limited meaning which will confine it within the limits of the provincial
jurisdiction.”). The Court’s rulings in cases like Derrickson are part of a larger body of case law
giving effect to the “interjurisdictional immunity” doctrine. The Court’s recent decisions confirm
that “impairment” of a “core” federal matter is the appropriate test for invoking the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine to read down, or restrict the application of, valid provincial legislation. See
Canadian Western Bank v. Alberta, [2007] S.C.J. No. 22, 2007 SCC 22, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 3, at para.
48 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Canadian Western Bank”]; Quebec (Attorney General) v. Lacombe, [2010]
S.C.J. No. 38, 2010 SCC 38, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 453, at para. 66 (S.C.C.); Quebec (Attorney General) v.
Canadian Owners and Pilots Assn., [2010] S.C.J. No. 39, 2010 SCC 39, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 536, at
para. 43 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “COPA”] per McLachlin C.J.C.
25
See Morris, supra, note 21. Strictly speaking., Morris, id., did not close the door altogether on provincial capacity to regulate treaty rights (even apart from the special constitutional
circumstances that arise from the prairie provinces’ NRTAs: see supra, note 16). Missing, for
example, from the 1850 treaties that were at issue in Morris were provisions, such as one that
appears in Treaty No. 8 (see online: <http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/al/hts/tgu/pubs/t8/trty8eng.asp#chp4>), subjecting the signatory peoples’ harvesting rights “to such regulations as may
from time to time be made by the Government of the country, acting under the authority of Her
Majesty …”. In Badger, supra, note 4, at para. 70, the Supreme Court held that Treaty No. 8, as well
as the Alberta NRTA, provided that “provincial game laws would be applicable to Indians so long as
they were aimed at conserving the supply of game”. What regulatory or other powers the provinces
may derive from treaties themselves require ascertainment case by case, and treaty by treaty.
26
See supra, notes 3-11, and accompanying text.
27
See especially supra, notes 3, 4, 8, 19-20 and 23, and accompanying text.
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Aboriginal right, which triggers the need for justification, and impairment of such a right, which triggers, under traditional doctrine, the more
absolute protection of interjurisdictional immunity. According to this
argument, when infringement of one of these rights falls short of impairment, provincial law may have effect as long as the province can
justify the infringement.
My principal concern about this proposed solution is (to paraphrase
Kate Monster from Avenue Q) that there’s a fine, fine line — too fine a
line for my juridical comfort — between infringement and impairment of
a treaty or Aboriginal right. According to Morris,28 the most recent
Supreme Court authority on the meaning of “infringement” in relation to
section 35 rights, “a prima facie infringement requires a ‘meaningful
diminution’ of a treaty right. This includes anything but an insignificant
interference with that right”.29 According to COPA,30 the most recent
Supreme Court authority on the meaning of “impairment” in the context
of interjurisdictional immunity, impairment “requires a significant or
serious intrusion” into the core or exercise of exclusive federal authority.31 Is there a reliably discernible distinction between a “meaningful
diminution” of a relevant right and a “significant or serious intrusion”
upon it? My personal inclination is to doubt that courts have developed
the tools with which to define and preserve, in a range of future cases
with unpredictable facts, such a subtle distinction.
But even if I am wrong about this, the distinction serves its intended
purpose only if “impairment” sets the higher bar of the two: only if, in
other words, all impairments are infringements but not all infringements
are impairments. If the Supreme Court’s decision in Morris is any
indication, however, it appears that the Court, if anything, considers the
opposite to be true. The majority judgment in Morris, having acknowledged that provincial laws that interfere with treaty rights to hunt are
constitutionally inapplicable to the bearers of such rights, adds this:
“[w]here such laws are inapplicable because they impair ‘Indianness’,
however, they may nonetheless be found to be applicable by incorporation under s. 88 of the Indian Act.”32 This is so, the Court adds, because
“[s]ection 88 reflects Parliament’s intention to avoid the effects of the
28

Supra, note 21.
Morris, id., at para. 53, citing with approval (at para. 52) an Aboriginal rights case, R. v.
Gladstone, [1996] S.C.J. No. 79, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 723, at para. 43 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Gladstone”].
30
Supra, note 24.
31
Id., at para. 45.
32
Morris, supra, note 21, at para. 43.
29
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immunity imposed by s. 91(24) by incorporating certain provincial laws
of general application into federal law.”33 But the legal effect of any
provincial laws incorporated pursuant to section 88 is “[s]ubject to the
terms of any treaty.”34 What triggers the statutory protection that section
88 confers on treaty rights, however, is a prima facie infringement of
such rights:35 “provincial laws or regulations that place a modest burden
on a person exercising a treaty right or that interfere in an insignificant
way with the exercise of that right do not infringe the right”.36 (The
reasoning of the dissenting judges on these matters is substantially
similar.)37
It is important to appreciate what is happening here. The Supreme
Court, having already established that the provincial law at issue in
Morris could not apply as such because it impaired the relevant treaty
right, prescribed a separate, subsequent inquiry to ascertain whether the
provincial law infringed that same treaty right. This second inquiry, the
one into infringement, serves no useful purpose unless it is at least
possible for a provincial law to impair a treaty right without infringing it.
If all such impairments were also understood to be infringements, the
Court’s subsequent question about infringement would not need asking:
it would answer itself.
A second possible way of seeking to reconcile the tension between
these two strains of jurisprudence is to suggest that section 35 is itself the
source of this new provincial authority to infringe the rights it protects. I
have argued at some length elsewhere38 that this suggestion seems
unsound, and why: because, in brief, it has no foundation in either the
text or the legislative history of the Constitution Act, 1982 and conflicts
with some post-1982 Supreme Court treaty rights jurisprudence. But
since then, the Supreme Court, in Morris, has expressed itself quite
clearly on this point:
Where a prima facie infringement of a treaty right is found, a province
cannot rely on s. 88 by using the justification test from Sparrow and
Badger in the context of s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, … The
purpose of the Sparrow/Badger analysis is to determine whether an
33

Id., at para. 44.
Id.; Indian Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-5, s. 88.
Morris, id., at para. 51.
36
Id., at para. 50.
37
See id., at paras. 90-100, per McLachlin C.J.C. and Fish J. (dissenting on other grounds).
38
See Kerry Wilkins, “Of Provinces and Section 35 Rights” (1999) 22 Dal. L.J. 185, at
217-19 [hereinafter “Wilkins, ‘Of Provinces’”].
34
35
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infringement by a government acting within its constitutionally
mandated powers can be justified. This justification analysis does not
alter the division of powers, which is dealt with in s. 88. Therefore,
while the Sparrow/Badger test for infringement may be useful, the
framework set out in those cases for determining whether an
infringement is justified does not offer any guidance for the question at
issue here.39

A final40 suggested means of leaving some room for justified provincial infringements of section 35 rights is section 88 of the Indian Act.
“Section 88,” the Court said in Morris, “reflects Parliament’s intention to
avoid the effects of the immunity imposed by s. 91(24) by incorporating
certain provincial laws of general application into federal law.”41 Accordingly, this argument runs, some provincial laws that impair section 35
rights can govern such rights nonetheless, provided that the impairment
can be justified. I have written at length about this, too,42 so I will be
quite brief here.
First, section 88 does not, and could not, do anything to increase the
provinces’ constitutional capacity. The most it can do is exactly what the
Supreme Court has said that it does: adopt into federal law certain
specified provincial measures and apply those measures as federal law to
statutory Indians. Once it is established that such laws cannot apply
because they impair section 35 rights, the task of justifying them falls to
the federal, not the provincial, order of government. To preserve the
validity of those provincial laws in their applications to those who are not
statutory Indians, the courts must presume that the provinces intended
that these laws be read down so as not to impair the relevant rights.
Second, we now know from Morris that section 88 itself will screen out
any provincial laws whose application would result in infringement of a
treaty right.43 At most, therefore, section 88 can facilitate infringement
39

Morris, supra, note 21, at para. 55 (emphasis added).
To the best of my knowledge.
41
Morris, supra, note 21, at para. 44. In fact, we know very little about Parliament’s real
intentions in adding what was then s. 87 to the Indian Act in 1951: see Kerry Wilkins, “Still Crazy
After All These Years: Section 88 of the Indian Act at Fifty” (2000) 38 Alta. L. Rev. 458 [hereinafter “Still Crazy”]. But the quotation in the text from Morris captures accurately the meaning and
function that the courts have ascribed to s. 88. After some considerable early judicial confusion
about s. 88’s operation, the Supreme Court provided definitive clarification in R. v. Dick, [1985]
S.C.J. No. 62, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 309, at 326-28 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Dick”].
42
See Wilkins, “Of Provinces”, supra, note 38, at 219-33; Wilkins, Morris, supra, note 12, at 30-31.
43
Morris, supra, note 21, at paras. 44-55, per Deschamps and Abella JJ. (for the majority);
at paras. 95-100, per McLachlin C.J.C. and Fish J. (dissenting on other grounds). The majority did
leave open the possibility that s. 88 could incorporate by reference provincial laws that infringe
40
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only of Aboriginal rights,44 and there have been occasional hints of
judicial doubt about even that.45 Third, section 88, by its terms, applies
exclusively to “Indians” as defined in the Indian Act,46 not, for example,
to Inuit or to most Métis. Fourth, although the issue has not yet been
settled definitively, the prevailing view in the lower courts and among
the commentators is that the provincial laws that section 88 incorporates
apply only to “Indians”, not to or in respect of Indians’ lands.47 Fifth, if
some infringement of an Aboriginal right does occur as a result of section
88’s intervention, it stands to reason that section 88 itself should be
called to account in any justification inquiry about that infringement. But
for section 88, the scheme the provincial law created could not have
applied in a manner that infringed the right.48 Finally, there is good
reason to doubt that section 88 could withstand scrutiny in a justification
inquiry under section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, precisely because
it takes no account of Aboriginal rights. In this respect, it is a statutory
analogue of the kind of “unstructured discretionary administrative regime
which risks infringing aboriginal rights in a substantial number of
applications” with which the Supreme Court found such fault in Adams.49
The problem, therefore, remains unresolved. Justified provincial infringement of Aboriginal rights (at least) has support in Supreme Court
treaty rights that have a commercial aspect (see id., at para. 46), but the rest of its reasoning on the
issue leaves little rational basis for such a distinction.
44
This is possible because the opening words of s. 88, “Subject to the terms of any treaty”,
carve out no comparable explicit exception for Aboriginal rights.
45
See, e.g., Badger, supra, note 4, at para. 69 (“Pursuant to the provisions of s. 88 of the
Indian Act, provincial laws of general application will apply to Indians. This is so except where they
conflict with aboriginal or treaty rights, in which case the latter must prevail”); Delgamuukw, supra,
note 4, at para. 183 (“the explicit reference to treaty rights in s. 88 suggests that the provision was
clearly not intended to undermine aboriginal rights”).
46
See Indian Act, s. 2(1), definition of “Indian”. But note that s. 88 is one of several Indian
Act provisions that is subject to the extended definition of “Indian” set out in s. 4.1 of that Act.
47
For detailed discussion of this issue, see “Still Crazy”, supra, note 41, at 483-97. For a
notable recent decision taking this position, see Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia, [2007]
B.C.J. No. 2465, 2007 BCSC 1700, at para. 1039 (B.C.S.C.), citing Kent McNeil, “Aboriginal Title
and Section 88 of the Indian Act” (2000) 34 U.B.C. L. Rev. 159; Brian Slattery, “Understanding
Aboriginal Rights” (1987) 66 Can. Bar Rev. 727, at 779-81.
48
Courts of Appeal in British Columbia (R. v. Alphonse, [1993] B.C.J. No. 1402, [1993] 5
W.W.R. 401, at paras. 62-65 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. Dick, [1993] B.C.J. No. 1396, [1993] 5 W.W.R. 446,
at paras. 17-18 (B.C.C.A.)) and Saskatchewan (R. v. Sundown, [1997] S.J. No. 377, [1997] 8
W.W.R. 379, at para. 61 (Sask. C.A.), affd without reference to the point, [1999] S.C.J. No. 13,
[1999] 1 S.C.R. 393 (S.C.C.)) have held that the justification inquiry in such situations need look
only at the infringing provincial measure, not at s. 88, but their reasoning to that conclusion
overlooks the fact that there could be no infringement but for s. 88.
49
R. v. Adams, [1996] S.C.J. No. 87, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 101, at para. 54 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
“Adams”].
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jurisprudence and has practical advantages, but the task of locating a
source within Canadian constitutional law for provincial authority to
infringe such rights, even justifiably, is proving to be unusually vexing.
And the rule of law requires that provinces not exceed the scope of their
constitutional authority.

II. THE ROAD NOT TAKEN AFTER ALL
For a while, it appeared that the Supreme Court of Canada had
shown us a pathway out of this predicament. In Canadian Western
Bank50 in 2007, the Court expressed significant displeasure with the
constitutional doctrine that gives rise to the problem: interjurisdictional
immunity. The Court said:
Canadian federalism is not simply a matter of legalisms. The
Constitution, though a legal document, serves as a framework for life
and for political action within a federal state, in which the courts have
rightly observed the importance of co-operation among government
actors to ensure that federalism operates flexibly.51

Viewed against this background, interjurisdictional immunity appeared
inconsistent with the “dominant tide” of contemporary constitutional
doctrine,52 which urged the Court to “avoid blocking the application of
measures which are taken to be enacted in furtherance of the public
interest” in “the absence of conflicting enactments of the other level of
government”.53 Inappropriate reliance on interjurisdictional immunity,
the Court concluded, “would create serious uncertainty”,54 risk creating
“legal vacuums”, which are, generally speaking, “not desirable”,55 and
“run … the risk of creating an unintentional centralizing tendency in
constitutional interpretation … incompatible with the flexibility and coordination required by contemporary Canadian federalism”.56 The Court
added this:

50

Canadian Western Bank, supra, note 24.
Id., at para. 42.
52
Id., at paras. 36-37, citing with approval O.P.S.E.U. v. Ontario (Attorney General),
[1987] S.C.J. No. 48, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 2, at 17 (S.C.C.), per Dickson C.J.C. (concurring).
53
Canadian Western Bank, id., at para. 37.
54
Id., at para. 43.
55
Id., at para. 44.
56
Id., at para. 45. See, to generally similar effect, Canada (Attorney General) v. PHS Community Services Society, [2001] S.C.J. No. 44, 2011 SCC 44, at paras. 61-65 [hereinafter “PHS”].
51

(2011), 54 S.C.L.R. (2d)

DANCING IN THE DARK

539

Finally, the doctrine would seem as a general rule to be superfluous in
that Parliament can always, if it sees fit to do so, make its legislation
sufficiently precise to leave those subject to it with no doubt as to the
residual or incidental application of provincial legislation. …57
For all these reasons, … we intend now to make it clear that the
Court does not favour an intensive reliance on the doctrine [of
interjurisdictional immunity] …58
Although the doctrine is in principle applicable to all federal and
provincial heads of legislative authority, the case law demonstrates that
its natural area of operation is in relation to those heads of legislative
authority that confer on Parliament power over enumerated federal
things, people, works or undertakings. …59

In “the absence of prior case law favouring its application to the subject matter at hand”, it became permissible, generally speaking, just to
skip the question of interjurisdictional immunity in division of powers
analysis.60
In the result, the appellant bank was unsuccessful in resisting the application of Alberta law to its business of promoting to its customers
certain kinds of insurance.
Although the Supreme Court was careful to go no farther than to say
that “interjurisdictional immunity is of limited application and should in
general be reserved for situations already covered by precedent”61 and to
acknowledge that “its existence is supported both textually and by the
principles of federalism”,62 it was terribly tempting to suppose that
Canadian Western Bank was the beginning of the end for interjurisdictional immunity and that the courts would soon find a way of removing
that inconvenient impediment altogether from provincial legislative
authority. Shorn of that obstacle, valid provincial legislation could
countenance infringement of Aboriginal (and, most probably, treaty)
rights, as long as the province could justify the infringement: just as the
Supreme Court keeps saying it can.63 The Court’s constitutional pronouncements on provincial authority seemed to be converging.

57
58
59
60
61
62
63

Canadian Western Bank, id., at para. 46.
Id., at para. 47.
Id., at para. 67. Compare id., at para. 41.
Id., at para. 78.
Id., at para. 77.
Id., at para. 33.
See supra, notes 3-11, and accompanying text.
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To some of us, this seemed like wishful thinking even then.64 For one
thing, the Court had said expressly in Canadian Western Bank that
“Aboriginal lands” were among the “things”, and “Aboriginal peoples”
among the “persons”, that had come within the traditionally recognized
purview of interjurisdictional immunity.65 By way of confirmation, it
added, in its discussion of “The Indian Cases”,66 that “in their federal
aspect (‘Indianness’), Indian people are governed by federal law exclusively …”67 And the Morris68 and Canadian Western Bank appeals were
under reserve together at the Supreme Court for several months.69 It is all
but inconceivable that the Court decided either of these appeals without
knowing what it was going to say in the other. If the Court’s intention in
Canadian Western Bank had been to overrule, or even to undercut the
authority, of a decision it had released just five months earlier, one would
have expected it to say so very clearly.70
But worse news, for those who predicted the obsolescence of the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine, came in the COPA decision71 in the
fall of 2010. In COPA, the Supreme Court held valid Quebec agricultural
zoning laws to be constitutionally incapable of restricting the placement
of aerodromes in that province, not because these laws conflicted with
federal aeronautics law — the Court said they did not72 — but because
they impaired core federal capacity to determine the locations of aerodromes. In reaching that conclusion, the Court, without overruling
64
65

See, e.g., Wilkins, “Morris”, supra, note 12, at 18-23.
Canadian Western Bank, supra, note 24, at para. 41. Compare PHS, supra, note 56, at

para. 60.
66

Canadian Western Bank, id., at paras. 60-61.
Id., at para. 61.
68
Supra, note 21.
69
The Supreme Court heard the Morris appeal, id., on October 14, 2005 and released its
decision on December 21, 2006; it heard Canadian Western Bank, supra, note 24, on April 11, 2006
and released its decision on May 31, 2007.
70
On the subject of overruling previous Supreme Court of Canada precedent, see most
recently Ontario (Attorney General) v. Fraser, [2011] S.C.J. No. 20, 2011 SCC 20 (S.C.C.).
According to Rothstein J., dissenting but not on this point:
in order to overrule its own precedent, the Court must be satisfied, based upon substantial
reasons, that the precedent was wrongly decided. It is not appropriate simply because of a
change in the composition of the Court that precedent should be overturned, because of
the views of newly appointed judges. There must be compelling reasons to justify overruling …
Id., at para. 130. The majority agreed (id., at paras. 56-57) and added (at para. 59) that the Court
should not overrule a precedent it has not been asked to overrule: “[a]bsent notice to the profession
and interested persons, overruling … seems to us procedurally inappropriate.” It appears to follow
necessarily that Supreme Court of Canada decisions cannot be overruled by implication.
71
Supra, note 24.
72
COPA, id., at paras. 62-74.
67
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Canadian Western Bank, managed to cast considerable doubt upon the
critique of interjurisdictional immunity set out in that earlier decision.
As mentioned above,73 the majority in Canadian Western Bank had
expressed an intention from then on to confine the application of interjurisdictional immunity to “its natural area of operation” as delineated by
prior case law: “those heads of legislative authority that confer on
Parliament power over enumerated federal things, people, works or
undertakings”.74 But the federal head of power at issue in COPA — the
power to make laws in relation to aeronautics — does not appear, or
derive from anything that appears, in the list of enumerated heads of
federal legislative authority; it derives instead, by inference, from the
residual federal power over peace, order and good government.75 Who
knew that federal authority over “the Peace, Order, and Good Government of Canada” — that which remains to the federal order after subtraction of all the classes of subjects assigned exclusively to the provinces76
— had a core of its own that is capable of resisting incidental impairment
under the provincial heads of power subtracted from it? Second, it is far
from clear that power over “aeronautics”, enumerated or not, qualifies as
a head of “power over … federal things, people, works or undertakings”.
Aeronautics is not a person or a class of persons, and it is hardly a thing
or class of things. One could, perhaps, classify it as a “work” or an
“undertaking” if one were willing to use those terms loosely, but used so
loosely, these terms could encompass almost any activity, including the
business of banking: the federally regulated activity held not to attract
interjurisdictional immunity in Canadian Western Bank. As for precedent, it is true that the Court had held, as early as Johannesson,77 that
aeronautics regulation is now a matter exclusively for federal regulation
because of its national dimensions; it held there, as well, that matters
73

See supra, notes 58-60, and accompanying text.
Canadian Western Bank, supra, note 24, at para. 67.
“Because commercial aviation was not foreseen in 1867, aviation is not articulated as a
head of power under s. 91 of the Constitution Act, 1867. However, it has been held to be a matter of
national importance and hence supported under the federal [Peace, Order and Good Government]
power”: COPA, supra, note 24, at para. 28.
76
The opening words of s. 91 of the Constitution Act, 1867 — the provision conferring
legislative authority on the federal order in Canada — read, in relevant part, as follows:
It shall be lawful for the Queen, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate and
House of Commons, to make Laws for the Peace, Order, and Good Government of Canada, in relation to all Matters not coming within the Classes of Subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to the legislatures of the Provinces …
77
Johannesson v. West Saint Paul (Rural Municipality), [1951] S.C.J. No. 50, [1952] 1
S.C.R. 292 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Johannesson”].
74
75
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relating to the placement of aerodromes and airports are essential to the
exercise of that authority. Never before, however, had the Supreme Court
protected aeronautical matters from incidental impairment resulting from
valid provincial law. In Johannesson, for instance, the Court had held
that the miscreant provincial law was altogether invalid, not that it was
valid but constitutionally inapplicable. If aeronautics lies within the
envelope said by precedent to attract the doctrine of interjurisdictional
immunity, it pushes firmly outward against the outer margins of that
envelope. This is not what one would expect from a court determined to
constrain, let alone to attrit, the reach of that immunity.
There is more. One finds in COPA no mention of, nor concern about,
what Canadian Western Bank had described as the “dominant tide” of
contemporary constitutional interpretation:78 a strong preference to leave
undisturbed, in the absence of proof of conflict between them, the
operation of laws enacted by both traditional orders of government, in
the interest of promoting flexible, cooperative federalism.79 If promotion
of a flexible, cooperative federalism were indeed the principal theme of
division of powers jurisprudence, one would have expected to see it
displayed particularly in a case such as COPA, which features legislation
from Quebec.80 Nowhere in Confederation is there greater attentiveness
to provincial legislative autonomy. There was, again, no conflict between
the permissive federal regime that dealt with placement of aerodromes
and the impugned provincial law, which required approval from a
provincial commission for any change in the use of designated agricultural lands.81 The reason, the Court said, why the provincial scheme
could not be allowed to constrain the placement of aerodromes on the
relevant lands was that, if it did:
it would force the federal Parliament to choose between accepting that
the province can forbid the placement of aerodromes on the one hand,
or specifically legislating to override the provincial law on the other
hand. This would seriously impair the federal power over aviation,
effectively forcing the federal Parliament to adopt a different and more
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See supra, notes 52-53, and accompanying text.
See Canadian Western Bank, supra, note 24, at paras. 36-37, 42-43, 45.
80
It is interesting that the Court’s two francophone judges from Quebec, LeBel and
Deschamps JJ., were in dissent in COPA.
81
COPA, supra, note 24, at paras. 62-74.
79
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burdensome scheme for establishing aerodromes than it has in fact
chosen to do.82

Put differently, the provincial law cannot apply because its application interferes with Parliament’s freedom to legislate, if it chooses,
permissively,83 or, by implication, to leave the relevant core federal
matter altogether unregulated.84 Missing altogether from the reasoning in
COPA are the concerns, expressed so forcefully in Canadian Western
Bank,85 about the risk of (potentially undesirable) legal vacuums and the
risk of unintentional centralization of power that were said to attend the
operation of interjurisdictional immunity.86 Missing too is the supposition
from Canadian Western Bank that the doctrine of interjurisdictional
immunity “would seem as a general rule to be superfluous”, because
Parliament may always achieve its ends by legislating expressly to oust
the inconvenient provincial regime.87
Finally, the COPA majority expressly preserves a place in Canadian
constitutional jurisprudence for interjurisdictional immunity.88
82
Id., at para. 60. Compare id., at para. 48: “Instead of the current permissive regime, Parliament would be obliged to legislate for the specific location of particular aerodromes. Such a
substantial restriction of Parliament’s legislative freedom constitutes an impairment of the federal
power.”
83
“Parliament would not be free to introduce broad, permissive legislation, should it so
choose (and as it has chosen to do) … [T]his … would narrow Parliament’s legislative options and
impede the exercise of its core jurisdiction”: id., at para. 53.
84
“In those circumstances where interjurisdictional immunity applies, the doctrine asks
whether the core of the legislative power has been impaired, not whether or how Parliament has, in
fact, chosen to exercise that power”: id., at para. 52.
85
Supra, note 24.
86
See supra, notes 55-56, and accompanying text. For a similar view, see Bruce Ryder,
“Equal Autonomy in Canadian Federalism: The Continuing Search for Balance in the Interpretation
of the Division of Powers” in J. Cameron & B. Ryder, eds. (2011), 54 S.C.L.R. at 565, at 590:
Treating a narrowing of Parliament’s legislative options as sufficient to amount to an
impairment of the exercise of its core jurisdiction, thus requiring the reading down of a
valid provincial law, turns the reasoning in Canadian Western Bank on its head. One of
the reasons Binnie and LeBel JJ. gave [in Canadian Western Bank] for restricting the
interjurisdictional immunity doctrine is that it risks creating undesirable legal vacuums.
In COPA and Lacombe, the Chief Justice stated that avoiding legal vacuums by permitting valid provincial laws to apply to core federal subject matters is problematic because
it forces Parliament to legislate if it wishes to overcome or supplement the rules set out in
provincial law. In other words, the Chief Justice would rather risk legal vacuums than
risk interference with Parliament’s legislative agenda [footnote omitted].
87
See supra, note 57 and accompanying text. Come to that, the Governor General still has
the constitutional authority, within one year of receiving notice of Royal Assent to a provincial
statute, to annul it altogether by disallowance: see Constitution Act, 1867, ss. 56, 90. But no one, to
my knowledge, has ever suggested that this is the only power the Constitution requires to deal with
provincial laws that are deemed inappropriate.
88
See COPA, supra, note 24, at para. 58, where the Court dispatches impatiently an argument
that, in its view “is, at bottom, a challenge to the very existence of the doctrine of interjurisdictional
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If the COPA decision is any guide, therefore, anticipations of the
death of interjurisdictional immunity have been, for better or worse,
exaggerated. What was said to be the “dominant tide” of constitutional
interpretation89 appears to have ebbed and to have left intact (ashore, as it
were) the paradox with which we began about provincial authority and
section 35 rights. The Court has said that the provinces may infringe
Aboriginal rights, but its rulings on interjurisdictional immunity have
complicated considerably the task of accounting, in a doctrinally respectable way, for the source of that authority.

III. SIGNS OF DISCOMFORT: NIL/TU,O AND NATIVE CHILD
The Supreme Court had two other opportunities during 2010 to consider the relationship between valid provincial legislation and life in
Aboriginal communities. Neither dealt with claims of treaty or Aboriginal right, but both concerned the limits on provincial authority in regard
to matters of considerable significance to those classified for constitutional purposes as Indians.
NIL/TU,O90 and Native Child91 were quite similar cases from British
Columbia and Ontario, respectively. The Court heard and decided them
together. At issue in both was which order of government, the federal or
the provincial, had legislative authority to regulate the labour relations of
provincially-incorporated child and family services societies, staffed
predominantly by Aboriginal people and partially funded by the federal
government. Both delivered, with provincial authority and under provincial supervision, specified child protection services primarily, if not
exclusively, to Aboriginal families: NIL/TU,O on reserve; Native Child
and Family Services off reserve, in downtown Toronto. The Court in both
cases concluded unanimously that the labour relations of the two entities
lay within provincial legislative authority, but divided 6-3 on the reasoning to that conclusion. NIL/TU,O is the principal case — Native Child
immunity. Among the reasons for rejecting a challenge to the existence of the doctrine,” the court
explains, “is that the text of the Constitution Act, 1867, itself refers to exclusivity:... The doctrine of
interjurisdictional immunity has been criticized but has not been removed from the federalism
analysis.”
89
See supra, notes 52-53, and accompanying text.
90
NIL/TU,O Child and Family Services Society v. B.C. Government and Service Employees’
Union, [2010] S.C.J. No. 45, 2010 SCC 45, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 696 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “NIL/TU,O”].
91
Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada v. Native Child and Family
Services of Toronto, [2010] S.C.J. No. 46, 2010 SCC 46, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 737 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
“Native Child”].
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did little more than apply its reasoning — so it is the one that requires the
closer attention.
Perhaps the easiest way of understanding the difference between the
two approaches to the same result in NIL/TU,O is by reference to the
following passage from Beetz J.’s majority judgment in Four B from
1980:
In my view the established principles relevant to this issue can be
summarized very briefly. With respect to labour relations, exclusive
provincial legislative competence is the rule, exclusive federal
competence is the exception. The exception comprises, in the main,
labour relations in undertakings, services and businesses which, having
regard to the functional test of the nature of their operations and their
normal activities, can be characterized as federal undertakings, services
or businesses: ... [citing authority].
There is nothing about the business or operation of Four B which
might allow it to be considered as a federal business: the sewing of
uppers on sport shoes is an ordinary industrial activity which clearly
comes under provincial legislative authority for the purposes of labour
relations. Neither the ownership of the business by Indian shareholders,
nor the employment by that business of a majority of Indian employees,
nor the carrying on of that business on an Indian reserve under a federal
permit, nor the federal loan and subsidies, taken separately or together,
can have any effect on the operational nature of that business. By the
traditional and functional test, therefore, The Labour Relations Act
applies to the facts of this case, and the Board has jurisdiction.
... It is argued that the functional test is inappropriate and ought to be
disregarded where legislative competence is conferred not in terms
relating to physical objects, things or systems, but to persons or groups
of persons such as Indians or aliens.
I cannot agree with these submissions.
The functional test is a particular method of applying a more general
rule namely, that exclusive federal jurisdiction over labour relations
arises only if it can be shown that such jurisdiction forms an integral
part of primary federal jurisdiction over some other federal object: the
Stevedoring case.
Given this general rule, and assuming for the sake of argument that
the functional test is not conclusive for the purposes of this case, the
first question which must be answered in order to deal with appellant’s
submissions is whether the power to regulate the labour relations in
issue forms an integral part of primary federal jurisdiction over Indians
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and Lands reserved for the Indians. The second question is whether
Parliament has occupied the field by the provisions of the Canada
Labour Code.
In my opinion, both questions must be answered in the negative.92

Both judgments in NIL/TU,O agree that the “operations and … normal activities”93 of the relevant employment enterprise are what needs
attention in the division of powers analysis.94 The disagreement between
them is about the relevance to this analysis, as it ought to apply to the
operations of NIL/TU,O or to those of Native Child, of what lies at the
core of exclusive federal authority over “Indians” pursuant to section
91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867.
The approach of the majority focuses on two portions of the Four B
passage just quoted. The first is from the initial cited paragraph:
The exception [to the general rule that matters relating to labour
relations lie within exclusive federal legislative authority] comprises, in
the main, labour relations in undertakings, services and businesses
which, having regard to the functional test of the nature of their
operations and their normal activities, can be characterized as federal
undertakings, services or businesses: ...95

The second is this clause, which appears in the next-to-last quoted
paragraph: “and assuming for the sake of argument that the functional
test is not conclusive for the purposes of this case”.96 From these materials, the majority concludes that the “functional test” for use in assigning
labour relations jurisdiction is nothing more than the inquiry into whether
the “operations and … normal activities” of the relevant enterprise “can
be characterized as federal undertakings, services or businesses”. It is
only if the results of the functional test, so understood, are inconclusive
that one need go on to consider whether provincial regulation of the
labour relations of the relevant employment enterprise would impair the
core of a federal head of power such as section 91(24).97 “At no point,”
the majority says:
92
Four B Manufacturing Ltd. v. United Garment Workers of America, [1980] S.C.J. No.
138, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 1031, at 1045-47 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Four B”].
93
Id., at 1045.
94
See NIL/TU,O, supra, note 90, at paras. 14-15, per Abella J. (for the majority), at para.
54, per McLachlin C.J.C. and Fish J. (concurring in the result).
95
Four B, supra, note 92, at 1045.
96
Id., at 1047.
97
See NIL/TU,O, supra, note 90, at paras. 3, 4 (“The ‘core’ of whatever federal head of
power happens to be at issue in a particular labour relations case has never been used by this Court
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in discussing the functional test [in Four B], does Beetz J. mention the
“core” of s. 91(24) or its content. In fact, he makes it clear that only if
the functional test is inconclusive as to whether a particular undertaking
is “federal”, should a court consider whether provincial regulation of
labour relations would impair the “core” of whatever federal regulation
governed the entity.98

The concurring judges focus instead on this passage from the third to
last paragraph of the text quoted from Four B:
The functional test is a particular method of applying a more general
rule namely, that exclusive federal jurisdiction over labour relations
arises only if it can be shown that such jurisdiction forms an integral
part of primary federal jurisdiction over some other federal object …99

This proposition, they argue, establishes that the purpose of the functional test is just to ascertain whether provincial regulation of the
relevant employment enterprise would impair the core of any exclusively
federal classes of subjects.100 Although they acknowledge that “Beetz J.’s
reasons in another passage[101] suggest that the functional test might be a
preliminary step to determining whether the activity forms an integral
part of primary federal jurisdiction,” they point out, correctly,102 that
“[i]n application, … Beetz J. went directly to a discussion of the scope of
the ‘core of Indianness’ and whether the activity at issue fell within that
core. He concluded that it did not.”103
It is difficult to argue that either of these competing approaches, understood solely as an interpretation of this Delphic passage from Four B,
is unreasonable or demonstrably preferable to the other. If asked, though,
I would have said that the approach the concurring judges prescribed was
to determine whether an entity is a ‘federal undertaking’ for the purposes of triggering the
jurisdiction of the Canada Labour Code”) and paras. 12-20, per Abella J. (for the majority).
98
Id., at para. 16.
99
Four B, supra, note 92, at 1047.
100
See NIL/TU,O, supra, note 90, at para. 58 (“Reading [the relevant earlier S.C.C. decisions on the issue] together, we see no reason to depart from the view that the central question is
whether the operation, viewed functionally in terms of its normal and habitual activities, falls within
the core of a federal head of power, in this case s. 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867”), at para. 60
(“The proper approach is simply to ask, as the cases consistently have, whether the Indian operation
at issue, viewed functionally in terms of its normal and habitual activities, falls within the core of s.
91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867”), and at para. 61 (“The functional analysis of the operation’s
activities is not a preliminary step; rather it provides the answer to whether the activity falls within
the protected core”), McLachlin C.J.C. and Fish J. (concurring in the result).
101
The passage quoted supra, note 96.
102
See Four B, supra, note 92, at 1047-49.
103
NIL/TU,O, supra, note 90, at para. 57, per McLachlin C.J.C. and Fish J. (concurring in
the result).
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better, sounder constitutional law. I hold this view for two reasons. First
and more important, it seems to me inconsistent with constitutional
principle (especially in the wake of COPA104) for provincial labour
relations regulation to be able to apply in a given situation despite
impairing the core of one or more heads of exclusive federal authority.105
And the only way of ensuring, in a case where the question arises, that
provincial labour relations law does not impair the core of federal
authority over something is to ask that question and answer it. Second,
even if this were not the case, there is no obvious reason why constitutional analysis of provincial labour relations laws should operate differently from constitutional analysis of other valid provincial legislation.
But the most important practical difference for present purposes between the two approaches is this: the approach of the concurring judges
required them to try to articulate the core of the “Indians” power in
section 91(24);106 the approach of the majority did not.107 What we find
in NIL/TU,O, therefore, is a proposal, offered by the three most senior
judges of the Supreme Court of Canada,108 for further consideration
when prescribing what is at the core of this head of power. Here it is:
We may therefore conclude that the core, or “basic, minimum and
unassailable content” of the federal power over “Indians” in s. 91(24) is
defined as matters that go to the status and rights of Indians. Where
their status and rights are concerned, Indians are federal “persons”,
regulated by federal law: see Canadian Western Bank, at para. 60.
It follows that a provincial law of general application will extend to
Indian undertakings, businesses or enterprises, whether on or off a
reserve, ex proprio vigore and by virtue of s. 88 of the Indian Act,
R.S.C. 1985, c. I-5, except when the law impairs those functions of the
enterprise which are intimately bound up with the status and rights of
Indians. The cases illustrate matters that may go to the status and rights
of Indians. These include, inter alia:

104

Supra, note 24.
Compare NIL/TU,O, supra, note 90, at para. 60, per McLachlin C.J.C. and Fish J.:
To exclude consideration of s. 91(24) would negate the federal power. Conversely, to
deem any Aboriginal aspect sufficient to trigger federal jurisdiction would threaten to
swallow the presumption that labour relations fall under provincial jurisdiction.
106
“In these circumstances ... the first step is to determine the extent of the core federal
undertaking or power”: id., at para. 61, per McLachlin C.J.C. and Fish J. (concurring in the result).
107
“Since in my view the functional test conclusively establishes that NIL/TU,O is a provincial undertaking, I do not see this case as being the first to require an examination of the ‘core’ of s.
91(24)”: id., at para. 4, per Abella J. (for the majority).
108
McLachlin C.J.C., Binnie and Fish JJ.
105
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•

Indian status: Natural Parents v. Superintendent of Child Welfare,
[1976] 2 S.C.R. 751, per Laskin C.J., writing for himself and three
other Justices, at pp. 760-61, and per Beetz J., writing for himself
and Pigeon J., at p. 787;

•

The “relationships within Indian families and reserve communities”:
Canadian Western Bank, at para. 61;

•

“[R]ights so closely connected with Indian status that they should
be regarded as necessary incidents of status such for instance as
registrability, membership in a band, the right to participate in the
election of Chiefs and Band Councils, reserve privileges, etc.”:
Four B, at p. 1048;

•

The disposition of the matrimonial home on a reserve: Paul v.
Paul, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 306;

•

The right to possession of lands on a reserve and, therefore, the
division of family property on reserve lands: Derrickson v.
Derrickson, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 285, at p. 296;

•

Sustenance hunting pursuant to Aboriginal and treaty rights, such
as the killing of deer for food: Dick;

•

The right to advance a claim for the existence or extent of
Aboriginal rights or title in respect of a contested resource or
lands: Delgamuukw and Kitkatla Band v. British Columbia
(Minister of Small Business, Tourism and Culture), 2002 SCC 31,
[2002] 2 S.C.R. 146; and

•

The operation of constitutional and federal rules respecting
Aboriginal rights: Paul v. British Columbia, among others.
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These examples make it clear that the focus of the analysis rests
squarely on whether the nature of the operation and its normal
activities, as distinguished from the people who are involved in running
it or the cultural identity of those who may be affected by it, relate to
what makes Indians federal persons as defined by what they do and
what they are: Dick; Delgamuukw.109

With respect, one can be grateful that paragraph 71 of NIL/TU,O did
not command the support of a majority of the Court. If it had, it would
have generated substantial doctrinal confusion. For several reasons, it
would be imprudent to use it as trustworthy guidance to the core of
section 91(24).
109
NIL/TU,O, supra, note 90, at paras. 70-72 (emphasis in original). See id., at para. 66 for
an earlier intimation that Indian “status and rights” are what comprise the core of s. 91(24).
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Consider first the opening sentence:
It follows that a provincial law of general application will extend to
Indian undertakings, businesses or enterprises, whether on or off a
reserve, ex proprio vigore and by virtue of s. 88 of the Indian Act,
R.S.C. 1985, c. I-5, except when the law impairs those functions of the
enterprise which are intimately bound up with the status and rights of
Indians.110

If Four B were one’s only frame of reference for the relevant law,111 one
might be excused for saying such a thing. But we have known since
Dick112 that no provincial legislation applies to Indians both ex proprio
vigore and pursuant to section 88; these categories operate in the alternative to one another.113 Section 88, in fact, comes into play precisely
when, and only when, a candidate provincial law “impairs those functions of the enterprise which are intimately bound up with the status and
rights of Indians”.114 Supreme Court decisions have reconfirmed these
conclusions repeatedly in the interim.115 This sentence errs, therefore, in
two respects: in supposing that section 88 operates on provincial laws
that apply to Indians of their own force, and in supposing that it does not
operate on provincial laws whose application would impair the core of
Indianness.

110

Id., at para. 71 (emphasis in original).
See Four B, supra, note 92, at 1049:
[W]hereas the Indian Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. I-6, regulates certain Indian civil rights such as
the right to make a will and the distribution of property on intestacy, it does not provide
for the regulation of the labour relations of Indians with one another or with non-Indians.
... These labour relations accordingly remain subject to laws of general application in
force in the Province as is contemplated by s. 88 of the Indian Act.
112
Supra, note 41.
113
See id., at 326-27:
I believe that a distinction should be drawn between two categories of provincial laws.
There are, on the one hand, provincial laws which can be applied to Indians without
touching their Indianness ... ; there are on the other hand, provincial laws which cannot
apply to Indians without regulating them qua Indians.
Laws of the first category, in my opinion, continue to apply to Indians ex proprio
vigore as they always did before the enactment of s. 88 in 1951 ... and quite apart from
s. 88. ...
I have come to the view that it is to the laws of the second category that s. 88 refers.
114
See, supra, note 110, and accompanying text.
115
See, e.g., Derrickson, supra, note 24, at 296-97; R. v. Francis, [1988] S.C.J. No. 43,
[1988] 1 S.C.R. 1025, at 1028-29, 1030-31 (S.C.C.); Côté, supra, note 3, at para. 86; Delgamuukw,
supra, note 4, at para. 182. But see R. v. Horseman, [1990] S.C.J. No. 39, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 901, at
936 (S.C.C.) per Cory J. (for the majority), where the Court appeared to have overlooked the
decision in Dick, supra, note 41, and the intervening jurisprudence.
111
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Consider next the second bulleted candidate the concurring judges
propose for inclusion in the core of section 91(24): “[t]he ‘relationships
within Indian families and reserve communities: Canadian Western
Bank, at para. 61.’”116 This is correct as far as it goes; Canadian Western
Bank says this:
Thus, in Natural Parents,[117] Laskin C.J. held the provincial
Adoption Act to be inapplicable to Indian children on a reserve because
to compel the surrender of Indian children to non-Indian parents
“would be to touch ‘Indianness’, to strike at a relationship integral to a
matter outside of provincial competence” (pp. 760-61).118

This proposition poses no problem in its application to the facts of
NIL/TU,O; NIL/TU,O, the society, possessed no powers of child protection at the time of the events that led to that litigation.119 But the powers
of the children’s aid society at issue in Native Child120 did include
“investigating allegations or evidence that children who are under the age
of sixteen years … may be in need of protection; protecting [those
children,] where necessary”; and “placing children for adoption”.121 On
the different facts of Native Child, one might in these circumstances have
expected at least some comment from the concurring judges on the
exercise of this provincial authority.122
The third bullet, a direct lift from Four B, gives no cause for doctrinal concern. The fourth and fifth, which deal with rights that pertain to
reserve lands, are suitable examples of core federal matters, but including
them in a list of core federal powers in relation to “Indians” overlooks
the reminder, also from Four B, that “Section 91.24 of the [Constitution]
Act, 1867 assigns jurisdiction to Parliament over two distinct subject
matters, Indians and Lands reserved for the Indians, not Indians on

116

NIL/TU,O, supra, note 90, at para. 71, per McLachlin C.J.C. and Fish J. (concurring in

the result).
117

Natural Parents v. Superintendent of Child Welfare, [1975] S.C.J. No. 101, [1976] 2
S.C.R. 751 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Natural Parents”].
118
Canadian Western Bank, supra, note 24, at para. 61.
119
See NIL/TU,O, supra, note 90, especially at paras. 29-30, per Abella J. (for the majority).
120
Supra, note 91.
121
Id., at para. 7, per Abella J. (for the majority).
122
Instead, they said only that they concurred with the majority, but “on the basis of the
approach outlined in our reasons in NIL/TU,O”: id., at para. 13. Consider here the merits of this
observation from the NIL/TU,O majority: “the question is not whether the entity’s operations lie at
the ‘core’ of the federal head of power; it is whether the provincial regulation of that entity’s labour
relations would impair the ‘core’ of that head of power”: NIL/TU,O, supra, note 90, at para. 20, per
Abella J. (emphasis in original).
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Lands reserved for the Indians.”123 These propositions relate more
properly to the core of the “Lands reserved” power.
It is the last three items in the concurring judges’ list from NIL/TU,O
that create the greatest potential for further constitutional confusion, both
for what they say and for what they do not say. It is true, for example,
that “Sustenance hunting pursuant to Aboriginal and treaty rights, such as
the killing of deer for food”124 has been placed at the core of federal
authority over “Indians”,125 but the Dick decision126 does nothing to
substantiate the point. It is not a treaty case;127 it involves no assertion of
Aboriginal rights;128 and the court expressly did not decide, but assumed
without deciding, that the relevant provincial law could not apply as such
to the hunting activity for which Mr. Dick was accused.129 (And why did
the court make no mention of Morris?)130 It is also true, however, that
this proposition understates, without explanation, the role of treaty and
Aboriginal rights in the core of exclusive federal authority under section
91(24). Earlier Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence had held, as
mentioned above, that the core of the “Indians” power houses both
Aboriginal and treaty rights per se, not just those that pertain to sustenance hunting.131
As for “[t]he right to advance a claim for the existence or extent of
Aboriginal rights or title in respect of a contested resource or lands,”132
one would have expected, other things equal, such a right to lie within
the range of provincial authority over “Procedure in Civil Matters” in the
courts of a province.133 We know from Paul134 that the provinces have
full constitutional capacity to authorize their administrative tribunals to
123
Four B, supra, note 92, at 1049-50 (emphasis in original). Compare Delgamuukw, supra,
note 4, at para. 178 (Aboriginal “rights in relation to land ... derive from s. 91(24)’s reference to
‘Lands reserved for the Indians’”); and generally, id., at paras. 174-178 (dealing separately with
federal legislative authority over “Lands reserved for the Indians” and over “Indians”).
124
NIL/TU,O, supra, note 90, at para. 71, quoted in text, supra, at note 109.
125
See, as regards subsistence treaty rights to hunt, Morris, supra, note 21, at para. 43, per
Deschamps and Abella JJ. (for the majority), and at paras. 91, 100, per McLachlin C.J.C. and Fish J.
(dissenting on other grounds).
126
Supra, note 41.
127
Id., at 312 (appellant “is a non-treaty Indian”), citing R. v. Dick, [1982] B.C.J. No. 2191,
3 C.C.C. (3d) 481, at 484 (B.C.C.A.), per Lambert J.A. (dissenting on other grounds).
128
See R. v. Dick, id., at 315 (“One issue that does not arise is that of Aboriginal Title or
Rights”).
129
See id., at 320-21.
130
Supra, note 21.
131
See supra, notes 17-21 and accompanying text.
132
NIL/TU,O, supra, note 90, at para. 71, quoted in text supra, at note 109.
133
Constitution Act, 1867, s. 92(14).
134
Supra, note 3.
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hear and determine claims of Aboriginal right brought before them in
otherwise proper proceedings135 and to deprive their tribunals of that
jurisdiction, either explicitly or by withholding from them power to
decide questions of law. (Provincially constituted courts appear to stand
in the same position.) This acknowledged provincial constitutional
authority seems indistinguishable from authority over “[t]he right to
advance a claim for the existence or extent of Aboriginal rights or
title.”136 And neither Delgamuukw137 nor Kitkatla,138 the two decisions on
which the concurring judges in NIL/TU,O rely for this proposition,
speaks thematically to the issue. In Kitkatla, no such question arose: the
appellant First Nation had abandoned any claim of Aboriginal right or
title by the time the case reached the Court.139 Delgamuukw did conclude
that the appellants’ claims of Aboriginal rights and title were not properly
before the Court,140 but it did so because of defects in the pleadings not
corrected by formal amendment. There was no suggestion that British
Columbia lacked authority to regulate the procedure for Aboriginal rights
or title claims prosecution through the courts.
Finally, the concurring judges say that “[t]he operation of constitutional and federal rules respecting Aboriginal rights” lies within the core
of exclusive federal authority over “Indians”. The reference here to
“federal rules respecting Aboriginal rights”, once properly understood,141
135

See id., at paras. 21-23, 34.
See id., at para. 21; Ontario (Attorney General) v. Pembina Exploration Canada Ltd.,
[1989] S.C.J. No. 9, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 206 (S.C.C.).
137
Supra, note 4.
138
Supra, note 22.
139
Id., at para. 47.
140
Delgamuukw, supra, note 4, at paras. 73-77.
141
In the absence of some relevant context or history, there would be good reason to doubt
that all federal rules about something federal — about Aboriginal rights, for example — lay within
exclusive federal legislative authority. Not all federal measures validly enacted engage the core of
some head of exclusive federal power: see, e.g., General Motors of Canada Ltd. v. City National
Leasing, [1989] S.C.J. No. 28, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 641 (S.C.C.). In this instance, however, there is
relevant context and history. In Ordon Estate v. Grail, [1998] S.C.J. No. 84, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 437
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Ordon Estate”], the Court held (at para. 68) that “Canadian maritime law is a
body of federal law [Constitution Act, 1867, s. 91(10)], uniform across the country, within which
there is no room for the application of provincial statutes” and (at para. 85) that “it is constitutionally
impermissible for the application of a provincial statute to have the effect of supplementing existing
federal rules of maritime negligence law in such a manner that the provincial law effectively alters
rules within the exclusive competence of Parliament or the courts to alter.” In Paul, supra, note 3,
the Court, relying on Ordon Estate (see, e.g., para. 15), held (at para. 19) that “[l]egislation that
triggers the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity purports to … alter rights and obligations. Such
inapplicable legislation may purport to ‘supplement’ existing federal rules,” but, id., that the
statutory grant of adjudicative jurisdiction to the British Columbia Forest Appeals Commission was
constitutionally permissible because it did “not attempt to supplement or amend the constitutional
136

554

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2011), 54 S.C.L.R. (2d)

seems defensible, but one would have expected neither order of government to have any constitutional authority, let alone exclusive authority,
unilaterally to provide for, alter or abolish constitutional rules, or their
operation, respecting Aboriginal rights.142
One relevant lesson from NIL/TU,O, therefore, appears to be that the
Court is unsure of its ground when it comes to provincial authority and
Aboriginal peoples, and perhaps when it comes to provincial authority
and interjurisdictional immunity. We will never know (or at least not in
time for the knowledge to help doctrinally), but it is, at the very least,
possible that the majority in NIL/TU,O took such pains to decouple the
functional test used in labour relations cases from the more generic
doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity in order not to have to concern
itself with the core of section 91(24) or to comment on the concurring
judges’ proposal in respect of that issue.

IV. NOTES TOWARD A CONVERSATION
At the close of 2010, therefore, we find ourselves, for present purposes, more or less where we were just before the Canadian Western
Bank decision: with an interjurisdictional immunity doctrine that has
refused to die and that continues to frustrate attempts to find a credible
constitutional source for provincial power to infringe/impair, even when
justified, existing treaty or Aboriginal rights. We are fated, a little longer
at least, to dwell within a constitutional order that, to this extent, remains
at war with itself.
I repeat that I have no ready solution. But one possible way of making progress when confronted with unacknowledged conflict between
and federal rules respecting aboriginal rights”. The analogy from Ordon Estate on which the court
relies in Paul holds only if Canadian Aboriginal rights law, like Canadian maritime law, “is a body
of federal law, uniform across the country, within which there is no room for the application of
provincial statutes”. This conclusion would likely make more practical difference than it currently
does if there were more of a body of federal law that deals with Aboriginal rights. To the best of my
knowledge, there is, at present, no federal statute law that is expressly about Aboriginal rights. We
do know, however, that the law of Aboriginal title is, by its nature, federal common law: see Roberts
v. Canada, [1989] 1 S.C.R 322 (S.C.C.).
142
See, e.g., Nova Scotia (Attorney General) v. Canada (Attorney General), [1951] S.C.J.
No. 32, [1951] S.C.R. 31 (S.C.C.) (neither order of government may transfer or delegate legislative
authority to the other); McEvoy v. New Brunswick (Attorney General), [1983] S.C.J. No. 51, [1983]
1 S.C.R. 704 (S.C.C.) (even acting in concert, provincial and federal legislatures cannot alter the
judicature scheme, including the guarantees of judicial independence, set out in ss. 96-101 of the
Constitution Act, 1867); R. v. Dick, supra, note 41, at 327-28 (Parliament may not prescribe
unilaterally when its legislation renders provincial legislation inoperative).
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contrary strands of doctrine is to explore the normative question that
underlies the conflict. In this instance, the normative question concerns
the kind of relationship that ought to subsist between provincial governments and Aboriginal communities bearing section 35 rights. One way of
sharpening our intuitions for such a discussion is to consider what it
would mean operationally if the courts were prepared, in the interest of
jurisprudential consistency, to allow the doctrine of interjurisdictional
immunity to have its effect, depriving provinces altogether143 of independent authority to impair existing treaty or Aboriginal rights. Would
such an outcome simply be constitutionally intolerable?
For purposes of the present discussion, I am going to make two assumptions. The first is that such an outcome, rightly or wrongly, would
frighten much of mainstream Canada, including many governments and
judges. My second assumption is that it would be unfair and inappropriate for our courts, on this account alone, to withhold accreditation from
otherwise eligible claims of treaty or Aboriginal right. What options exist
for managing relationships somewhat harmoniously in a setting that
features both of these assumptions?
A sensible place to begin is by remembering that such a setting need
not leave existing treaty or Aboriginal rights entirely unregulated.
“Federal legislative powers continue, including, of course, the right to
legislate with respect to Indians pursuant to s. 91(24) of the Constitution
Act, 1867.”144 We know, as well, that there are ways of involving provincial governments in the design and administration of regulatory regimes
that govern core federal matters. Federal fisheries regulation in Ontario is
an illustrative example. The Fisheries Act145 authorizes regulations
implementing the legislation; Canada has chosen to enact regulations
specific to individual provinces or regions. To the best of my knowledge,
the government of Ontario is, at a minimum, heavily involved in helping
design the Ontario Fishery Regulations, 2007 from time to time;146 those
regulations, in turn, repose considerable discretion in the Ontario
Minister of Natural Resources and its officials in regard to the implementation, administration and enforcement of the federal scheme. In Peralta,

143
Apart from those whose “laws respecting game” operate despite ordinary division of
powers principles, pursuant to the Natural Resources Transfer Agreements and the Constitution Act,
1930. See discussion, supra, at note 4.
144
Sparrow, supra, note 4, at 1109.
145
R.S.C. 1970, c. F-14; now R.S.C. 1985, c. F-14.
146
Currently SOR/2007-237.
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the Ontario Court of Appeal147 and the Supreme Court of Canada148 each
affirmed unanimously the constitutional legitimacy of this arrangement.
Such arrangements, of course, depend for their effectiveness on political
will, considerable intergovernmental cooperation and careful legislative
and regulatory drafting; in other words, on voluntary embrace of the
principles of flexible, cooperative federalism. But where such conditions
obtain, there appears to be no constitutional impediment to extensive
provincial involvement, under federal auspices, in the development,
implementation and enforcement of regulations governing the exercise of
section 35 rights, always assuming that the regulatory arrangements
themselves meet the Supreme Court’s tests for justification of measures
or conduct that infringes such rights.149
But whether or not the federal order elects to use its unquestioned
power to regulate the exercise of section 35 rights, and whether or not, in
doing so, it elects to involve the provinces in the design and enforcement
of any such scheme, the courts already have means, if they choose to use
them, by which to police the constitutionally protected scope of such
rights. Consider the implications of two defining features of treaty and
Aboriginal rights: that they are communal in character; and that they
derive — explicitly in the case of Aboriginal rights;150 indirectly in the
case of treaty rights framed to preserve “usual” or “former” “habits”,
“vocations” or “avocations” — from ascertainable customs, traditions
and practices deemed to be of integral significance to the ways of life of
particular right-bearing communities.
It is now well established that both treaty rights151 and Aboriginal
rights152 are, by nature, communal and are available to individuals for
exercise only by virtue of their membership in right-bearing communities
or, exceptionally, with the prior permission of an Aboriginal community
147

Peralta v. Ontario, [1985] O.J. No. 2304, 49 O.R. (2d) 705 (Ont. C.A.), affd [1988]
S.C.J. No. 92, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 1045 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Peralta”].
148
[1988] S.C.J. No. 92, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 1045 (S.C.C.).
149
For the justification requirements for infringements of treaty rights and various kinds of
Aboriginal rights, see Sparrow, supra, note 4, at 1108-11, 1113-19; Badger, supra, note 4, at paras. 8285, 96-99; Gladstone, supra, note 29, at paras. 54-84; Delgamuukw, supra, note 4, at paras. 161-169.
150
See, e.g., R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] S.C.J. No. 77, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507, at paras. 44, 46
(S.C.C.).
151
R. v. Marshall, [1999] S.C.J. No. 66, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 533, at para. 17 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Marshall II”], R. v. Shipman, [2007] O.J. No. 1716, 2007 ONCA 338, 85 O.R. (3d) 585, at
paras. 43, 50 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter “Shipman”].
152
For Métis Aboriginal rights, see R. v. Powley, [2003] S.C.J. No. 43, 2003 SCC 43, [2003]
2 S.C.R. 207, at para. 44 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Powley”]; for other Aboriginal rights, see Sappier,
supra, note 6, at para. 26; R. v. Kapp, [2008] S.C.J. No. 42, 2008 SCC 41, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 483, at
para. 4 (S.C.C.).
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other than one’s own, to which the right belongs.153 Delgamuukw154
confirms that some such rights, at least, embody and protect a sphere of
collective decision-making in respect of the subject matter of the right.155
It is sensible to suppose that such collective decision-making typically
manifests generically through contemporary interpretation and application of the customs, traditions and practices normative within a given
community. Such customs, traditions and practices, therefore, can be said
to prescribe the default conditions governing permissible participation in
communal treaty or Aboriginal rights.
Jurisprudence from other Commonwealth countries has accepted this
proposition explicitly. A body of New Zealand jurisprudence, for example, has emphasized that “the exercise of rights to fish” in traditional
Maori communities “was circumscribed by well established criteria”:
[that] the gathering of fish, although a well developed process and
conditioned by centuries of experience and accumulated knowledge,
was accompanied by rules emanating from tribal authority and
practices and customs and no doubt adapted as the years went by to
environment and requirements through time.156

A more recent judgment of the High Court of Australia has this to say
about the “privilege” of individual exercise of a communal native
customary right:
[S]uch a finding [viz., that a community has a right to hunt estuarine
crocodiles on its traditional lands] will not necessarily dispose of the
question of whether a particular individual or sub-group within that
community has the privilege to hunt estuarine crocodiles. The nature
and scope of the privileges in question will vary with the traditional
laws and customs of the particular community so as to accord with the

153
See, e.g., Shipman, supra, note 151; R. v. Meshake, [2007] O.J. No. 1714, 2007 ONCA
337, 85 O.R. (3d) 575 (Ont. C.A.).
154
Supra, note 4.
155
See id., at paras. 115, 166, 168 (decisions with respect to Aboriginal title land are made
by the title-holding community). At para. 168, the Court says that the “aboriginal right to fish for
food, by contrast, does not contain within it the same discretionary component”. If what the Court
means is that a right to fish for food cannot, as such, authorize a community to harvest fish for uses
other than food, one can hardly disagree. Given the context in which the issue arose in Delgamuukw,
id., it seems unnecessary to suppose that the Court meant anything more by this observation.
156
See, e.g., R. v. Campbell, [1989] D.C.R. 254, at 271 and 269 (N.Z. Dist. Ct.). Compare,
e.g., Te Weehi v. Regional Fisheries Officer, [1986] 1 N.Z.L.R. 680, at 682-83, 692-93 (H.C.).

558

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2011), 54 S.C.L.R. (2d)

distinct social structure and patterns of occupancy and use of the land
of that indigenous community.157

Closer to home, the Ontario Court of Appeal has already held that “[i]n
Aboriginal custom, protection and conservation of harvesting resources
is paramount” and that “[a]ny departure from this aspect of Aboriginal
custom would probably negative any consent” that an outsider from a
different Aboriginal community might receive to share in the exercise of
the home community’s treaty or Aboriginal harvesting rights.158
These doctrinal foundations equip Canadian courts to hold, if they
choose, that no individual may invoke the protection of an existing treaty
or Aboriginal right for particular conduct unless he or she can show that
the relevant conduct either: (1) conforms with the norms and principles
internal to the right-bearing community that inform and define the
relevant right; or (2) has the approval — the prior approval, Shipman
suggests159 — of the governing authorities of the community to which
the right belongs in the relevant geographic area. Such an approach
would have at least two salutary consequences. On the one hand, it
would afford a check against the frolics of rogue members of rightbearing Aboriginal communities by requiring, as a prerequisite for
constitutional protection of the conduct impugned, that the community
itself acknowledge some responsibility for community members160 and
for their conduct. On the other hand, it would require the mainstream
legal order to accept that certain rights it explicitly recognizes and

157

ring).

158

Yanner v. Eaton, [1999] HCA 53, 201 C.L.R. 351, at para. 74, per Gummow J. (concur-

Shipman, supra, note 151, at para. 45. See also id., at para. 51.
Shipman, id., at para. 50:
First, as I said, treaty rights are communal; any consent that may be granted must reflect
respect for the community of treaty rights holders, which means that any consent granted
to share the harvesting resource must weigh and consider the communal interest. In order
to properly do this, the person capable of granting the consent would normally require the
request in advance.
See generally id., at paras. 49-53.
160
We know from Powley, supra, note 152, that “accept[ance] by the modern community …
an objective demonstration of a solid bond of past and present mutual identification and recognition
of common belonging between the claimant and other members of the rights-bearing community” is
a condition precedent for eligibility to exercise the Aboriginal rights of a Métis community: id., at
para. 33 (emphasis in original). Although, to the best of my knowledge, the courts have not yet
addressed the issue, it is reasonable to suppose that a comparable prerequisite governs individuals’
eligibility to exercise the s. 35 rights of Indian or Inuit communities.
159
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affirms entail, and in this respect depend upon, a dimension of Aboriginal
self-government.161
But limits that flow from communities’ own understandings and
ways of ordering integral shared activities are not the only available tools
for judicial constraint on the constitutionally protected scope of section
35 rights. Recall the well-known proposition that treaty rights to hunt do
not protect the right to hunt unsafely. In Morris,162 for instance, the
majority said that “it could not have been within the common intention of
the parties [to the 1850 Douglas Treaties] that the Tsartlip would be
granted a right to hunt dangerously, since no treaty confers on its beneficiaries a right to put human lives in danger”.163 This conclusion derived
neither from close textual analysis of the Douglas Treaties, nor from
research into the negotiations that led to those treaties; it derived from a
shared sense that such a treaty right simply would not do in Canadian
law: that the Crown, acting rationally, could never agree to such a thing.
The same is true in each of the other decisions I have found that deemed
safety to be an internal limit on the permissible exercise of treaty rights
to hunt.164 In essence, these decisions appear to be saying, though in
different words, that it would be contrary to public policy to extend
constitutional protection to unsafe activity.
Consider now Myran,165 the first Supreme Court decision that, to my
knowledge, dealt with public safety and the hunting rights of Aboriginal
peoples. At issue there was not a hunting right set out in a treaty, but the
hunting right prescribed and preserved in paragraph 13 of the Manitoba
161
This is not the place to discuss in detail possible constitutional rights of self-government.
Suffice it for present purposes to note that the Supreme Court of Canada appears to have left at least
slightly ajar the door to eventual accreditation of self-government rights (see R. v. Pamajewon,
[1996] S.C.J. No. 20, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 821, at paras. 24-25 (S.C.C.); Delgamuukw, supra, note 4, at
paras. 170-171) and the British Columbia Supreme Court has upheld the validity of the Nisga’a
Treaty in part because it preserves and codifies pre-existing self-government rights that the Nisga’a
already had: see Campbell v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [2000] B.C.J. No. 1524, 189
D.L.R. (4th) 333 (B.C.S.C.).
162
Supra, note 21.
163
Id., at para. 35, per Deschamps and Abella JJ. (for the majority). Compare id., at para.
110, per McLachlin C.J.C. and Fish J. (dissenting on other grounds).
164
See, e.g., Simon, supra, note 21, at 403 (“it is implicit in the right granted under article 4
of the Treaty of 1752 that the appellant has the right to possess a gun and ammunition in a safe
manner in order to be able to exercise the right to hunt”); R. v. Paul and Paul, [1987] N.B.J. No.
194, 80 N.B.R. (2d) 1, at para. 28 (N.B.Q.B.) (relying on Simon, id.); R. v. Napoleon, [1985] B.C.J.
No. 2070, [1985] 6 W.W.R. 302, at 310 (B.C.C.A.) (“It is implicit in Treaty Number 8 that the
obligation to hunt safely applies throughout the areas where hunting is permitted by the treaty”);
R. v. McCoy, [1993] N.B.J. No. 597, 109 D.L.R. (4th) 433, at 437-38 (N.B.C.A.) (relying on Simon,
id., and R. v. Paul and Paul, id.).
165
Myran v. R., [1975] S.C.J. No. 69, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 137 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Myran”].

560

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2011), 54 S.C.L.R. (2d)

Natural Resources Transfer Agreement,166 a constitutional instrument.
Dismissing an appeal from conviction on provincial unsafe hunting
charges, the Court concluded that there is “no irreconcilable conflict”
between the right and the statutory requirement “that such right be
exercised in a manner so as not to endanger the lives of others”.167
“Inherent in the right,” the Court said, quoting with approval from the
judgment in the court below, “is the quality of restraint, that is to say that
the right will be exercised reasonably.”168
This principle — that “the quality of restraint” inheres in the constitutional rights of Aboriginal peoples — is susceptible to generalization
beyond issues of safety and rights to hunt. It could give the courts
permission to read down existing treaty or Aboriginal rights where
necessary to construe them “in a manner consistent with the fundamental
values enshrined in the Constitution”.169 (Such a course would be quite
consistent with the rule in English law that “a custom to be valid must be
such that, in the opinion of a trained lawyer, it is consistent, or, at any
rate, not inconsistent, with those general principles which, quite apart
from particular rules or maxims, lie at the root of our legal system.”)170
Further work, of course, would be needed to identify any relevant
“fundamental values” and to determine when it is apposite for the courts
to invoke them. Species and habitat conservation might, however,
deserve at least some consideration as possible reasons to invoke “the
quality of restraint”.171
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Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union, Local 580 v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd.,
[1986] S.C.J. No. 75, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573, at 603 (S.C.C.); R. v. Salituro, [1991] S.C.J. No. 97,
[1991] 3 S.C.R. 654, at 675 (S.C.C.).
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Johnson v. Clark, [1908] 1 Ch. 303, at 311.
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Space does not permit a thorough discussion of this suggestion here. Suffice it for now to
say that argument supporting it would have to be crafted with care. In R. v. Kruger, [1978] S.C.J.
No. 43, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 104 (S.C.C.), the Supreme Court expressed some displeasure at the prospect
that a province might “act … in such a way as to oppose conservation and Indian claims to the
detriment of the latter”. And on at least two more recent occasions in — Simon, supra, note 21, at
413, and in Badger, supra, note 4, at paras. 90-94, the Court has held that particular provincial
measures acknowledged to have been enacted for conservation purposes can and do conflict with,
infringe, existing treaty rights to hunt. From this, it follows that conservation as defined by the
province is not, as such, an internal limit on the reach of these rights. There may still be room to
argue, however, that “reasonable” exercise of such rights does not include conduct inconsistent with
basic conservation imperatives as defined by the courts, independent of provincial conservation
policy. Certain forms and concentrations of harvesting activity, in other words, might be perceived
to be so clearly unacceptable that no treaty or Aboriginal right cognizable in Canadian law could be
deemed to countenance them.
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The significance for present purposes of both kinds of internal limits
on treaty or Aboriginal rights — those that derive from a community’s
own understanding of its customs and those that derive from judicial
intuitions about public policy — is that they would render certain kinds
of unwelcome conduct subject to relevant provincial law, even if the
perpetrator belonged to a right-bearing Aboriginal community and even
if the provinces have no capacity to impair section 35 rights or their
exercise. “Valid provincial laws that fall outside the scope of the treaty
[or Aboriginal] right, by virtue of an internal limit on the treaty [or
Aboriginal] right, do not go to ‘core Indianness’ and thus apply ex
proprio vigore.”172
The preceding discussion appears to suggest that the sky need not
fall if the provinces turn out not to have independent constitutional
authority to impair existing treaty or Aboriginal rights or their exercise.
There are several ways, alone or in combination, in which the Canadian
constitutional order might, even then, accommodate such rights responsibly. It need not find ways, on that account, of screening out all but the
most innocuous candidates.
I do not pretend that this settles the issue. At most, it offers some options for going on within a constitutional order that continues to feature
interjurisdictional immunity and is not able to conjure any doctrinally
stable explanation for exempting treaty or Aboriginal rights from the
application of that principle. My hope is that they offer material for the
normative conversation I believe we need to have about the kind of
relationship that ought to exist in Canadian law between provinces and
right-bearing Aboriginal communities.173
We all have a stake in resolution of the current doctrinal impasse
over provincial capacity to infringe section 35 rights. There are times, as
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Morris, supra, note 21, at para. 100, per McLachlin C.J.C. and Fish J. (dissenting on
other grounds). Compare R. v. Marshall, [1999] S.C.J. No. 55, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 456, at para. 61
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Marshall I”], Marshall II, supra, note 151, at paras. 36-39.
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If those options seem unpalatable, a final additional option — amending the Constitution
itself — may warrant at least some attention. If Kitkatla, supra, note 22, and Morris, supra, note 21,
are any indication of the federal position, this is an instance in which provincial and federal interests
would align; both would favour ensuring provincial capacity, subject to justification, to constrain
s. 35 rights to the point of infringement. (In both appeals, Canada supported the province’s claims of
authority: see Kitkatla, id., at para. 72; Factum of the Intervener the Attorney General of Canada,
Ivan Morris and Carl Olsen v. Her Majesty the Queen (August 3, 2005), at para. 45.) Any such
proposal would require a prior constitutional conference involving first ministers and “representatives of the aboriginal peoples of Canada”: Constitution Act, 1982, s. 35.1, added by the Constitutional Amendment Proclamation, 1983, SI/84-102. But in the present circumstances, such a
conference hardly seems a bad thing, with or without the prospect of a constitutional amendment.
This is an issue that deserves, and appears to require, cooperative collective deliberation.
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St. Paul174 and Justice Binnie175 have each acknowledged, when we have
no choice except to see things “as through a glass, darkly”, but this, with
great respect, is not one of them. And this may well be one of the
surprisingly frequent occasions in law when having an answer is more
important than what the answer is.
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